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1. INTRODUCTION
Roughly a quarter of a century ago,
developing countries.' in large numbers,2
signed on to the 1994 revision of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 ("GKTT
1994") and to membership in its umbrella
institution, the World Trade Organization
("WTO")f Notwithstanding their erstwhile
reluctance to do business with and compete
against developed countries that in many
instances had been colonial oppressors, they
took on substantial obligations under the
WTO agreements. Developing countries
did so, in part, because they feared being left
behind economically in a world where free
trade prospered.
Importantly, developing countries had
been assured, over the course of many years,'
that they would be provided with appropriate
assistance to ease their transition toward
full standing in the international trading
community. As Michael Trebilcock explains
these accommodations under the current
WTO structure:
An extensive legal framework has
been established to provide a basis
for the special and differential
treatment ("SDT") of developing
countries under WTO law. This
encompasses both import-branch
SDT by providing greater flexibility
and exemptions for developing
countries in implementing WTO
disciplines and export-branch
SDT by enabling Members to
offer preferential market access
to developing countries without
violating the WTO's cornerstone
Most Favored Nation ("MFN")
obligation.'
In some instances, assistance meant
that developing countries were given longer
periods of time to achieve compliance with
international trade obligations.6 In other
occurrences, developed countries promised-
or seemed to promise-economic assistance.'
For many developing countries, those
assurances were important. However, the
ultimate reality was that developing countries
took "on many mandatory obligations
in exchange for non-binding and 'best
endeavour concessions from the developed
countries.""' Not surprisingly, some
developing countries felt seriously aggrieved
when they realized that they had given more,
in terms of intellectual property obligations,
than they had gained in terms of economic
trade assistance."
Ihere is some evidence that developing
countries have enjoyed greater prosperity as
a result of modernizing their legal systems
to comply with WTO obligations.2
Nevertheless, the recent Doha Round of
trade talks, which ended in December
2015, after fourteen years of unproductive
negotiations,1' failed to successfully address
many issues of importance to developing
countries." As the New York Times opined,
the failure of the Doha Round's "ambitious
agenda . . . undermined the credibility of
the multilateral trading system and hurt
the least-developed countries, which are
desperate to export more of their goods
to richer countries."3 In this context, it is
not surprising that the developed world's
lack of progress in furnishing assistance to
developing countries has left many WTO
members disappointed and disillusioned."
During the next 25 years, the concerns
of developing countries are certain to remain
a subject of importance in international
economic law. Indeed, these issues are likely
to be so weighty, so arguably legitimate,
2
and so difficult to address, that in the
current climate which often favors economic
protectionism" they may threaten the
viability of the modern free trade regime.
'This is particularly true because developing
countries comprise a large section of the
international trading community'9 and are
"an increasingly powerful force both in the
global economy and in the WTO bargaining
process through which multilateral rules are
crafted."20
This article will consider some of the
many international economic law issues
that are important to developing countries.
However, it will do so with a special focus
on Burma, and what Burma needs as it
rebuilds its economy. Burma had once been
prosperous and oriented towards free trade.
Indeed, Burma had been a party to the
1947 GATT,2 1 the agreement which formed
the cornerstone of the modern liberal trade
regime."Ihen, beginning in the early 1960s,
almost 50 years of inept military rule23
destroyed the Burmese economy, blocked off
the outside world, and isolated the country,24
which was re-named "Myanmar" by its
dictators. Officially, the United States still
refers to the country as Burma." Today, as
Burma begins to recover economically, it has
to think deeply about what type of economic
policies are best for the fragile state,'6 free
trade or protectionism?2 7 If free trade is the
better path, how can trade liberalization most
effectively be promoted, and how can threats
to Burma's economic viability be minimized?
Today, as Burma begins to
recover economically, it has
to think deeply about what
type ofeconomic policies are
bestfor the fragile state, fee
trade or protectionism?
The answers to these questions are
not obvious. Many observers of the global
economy are hostile to trade liberalization.
Workers hold free trade responsible for the
V
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loss of good jobs." Social activists condemn
free trade for spawning inhumane work
conditions and environmental degradation.25
Some developing countries now complain,
as did Progressives in the early twentieth
century Britain,"o that free trade exacerbates
differences in income and wealth," favoring
those who already have wealth over those
who do not. Today's producers of goods
and services, like those in the 1920s and
1930s, are often more interested in enacting
protectionist measures to insulate them from
foreign competition rather than proving that
they can compete by offering goods and
services in a "flattened" world.3 2 Multilateral
trade liberalization is a subject that remains
"highly contentious."3 3
Part II of this article surveys the political,
economic, and social conditions in Burma
today. Part III considers the international
trade issues faced by Burma. Part IV discusses
issues that are of concern to developing
countries generally, then focuses on two
issues that are especially important. The first
issue is building the kind of educational
capacity that makes it possible for a country
to make sound decisions on trade-related
issues. The second issue involves establishing
an effective anti-corruption infrastructure
that builds public confidence in international
trade and minimizes the costs of competing
in the global marketplace. Part V offers
concluding thoughts on what is really
at stake in developing countries, such as
Burma, and in the broader world economic
community, relating to the ongoing struggle
between defenders of liberal trade policies
and the proponents of protectionist regimes
that would insulate the sellers of goods and
services from international competition.
II. BuRMA TODAY
It is impossible to think clearly about
what Burma needs from international
economic law without knowing the country's
recent history and current economic and
social conditions. This section addresses
those matters.3 1
Nobel Peace Prize laureate,"3 Aung
San Suu Kyi, has served as state counsellor
of Burma since 2016.3' Although she is
essentially the prime minister, the country's
struggle to build a democracy seems to have
stalled. There is only bad news out of Burma,
according to Western media reports. Endless
sobering articles tell about the persecution of
the Rohingya minority,7 the flight of refugees
to Bangladesh,3 1 the recruitment of child
soldiers,3 1 corruption and incompetence in
the courts,4 0 ethnic cleansing,4' repression
of journalists,42 violence by Buddhists4 3 and
the murder of a top Muslim adviser to the
Burmese government.4
Critics argue that Suu Kyi lacks the
conviction to do what is required to create
a modern, stable progressive democracy.
However, that is almost surely wrong.46
Suu Kyi's life story paints a wholly different
picture. Her character was forged by the
assassination of her father,47 by her work at the
United Nations, by her house confinement
for fifteen years as a political prisoner, and
by the assassination attempt on her that left
countless supporters dead or injured.
For thirty years, Suu Kyi has led the fight
for democracy in Burma. What she lacks is
not courage or commitment to democratic
values, but the institutional capacity to move
the country faster toward such goals. By law,
the military still holds one-fourth of the seats
in Parliament4 and can block legislation that
it does not favor.
More than a half-century of dictatorial
misrule by the military took a heavy toll
on Burma. What was once one of the best-
educated nations in Asia4' is now one of the
least educated.5 0 What was once one of the
richest nations in Asia is now one of the
poorest." What was once a colony brave
enough to demand its independence from
the British Empire52 is now a timid country
terrorized by decades of repression. The
risk that the country's military might again
assert full control over the government seems
to hover just off-stage." Ever "[slince the
country's independence in 1948, [Burma]
has been politically unstable and has engaged
in civil conflict."' 4
Suppose that, in a fledgling democracy,
for a majority of the past three decades the
universities were closed," government-
perpetrated violence was common,56 the
teaching of political science was forbidden,'
7
and vast numbers of children were denied even
a basic education.'8 What would that mean?
One would expect democratic impulses to
be stunted and for it to be very difficult to
pursue democratic ideals effectively. That is
precisely what has happened in Burma."
In 2017-2018, I spent four months
teaching as a Fulbright scholar6 0 at the
University of Mandalay,6' in Burma's second
largest city. Mandalay is a city composed of
about 1.2 million people6 2 in a country the
size of Texas,' but with more than twice its
population, nearly 54 million.
64
The University of Mandalay law school
is ranked the best in Burma. However,
a visitor cannot help but notice that the
library is meager and poorly lit, that parts of
the campus crumble in ruins, that birds fly
through dusty classrooms even when courses
are in session, and that almost the entire
middle tier of law faculty is missing.
There are a few experienced, older
law professors who survived many decades
of military rule and who are reassuringly
intelligent, future-minded, and prudent.
There are also many very young law faculty
members-newly minted Ph.D.s who are
bright and eager but inexperienced.
Between these two extremes, there are
almost no other qualified faculty members at
the school. There is a missing generation that
grew up when the universities were closed
and the teaching of dangerous subjects was
forbidden.
The absence of the faculty middle tier
means that much of the professional wisdom
and courage that comes with experience is
missing from the law school. There is no
easy way to fill that void. It will simply
take time to develop the strengths that are
lacking."5 That includes many skills that are
indispensable to a strong democracy, such
as independent thought, free expression,
passionate advocacy, and insistence on honest
practices.
Burma lacks the institutional
capacity to move faster
toward full democracy.
Experienced Western observers of the
Burmese government say that Suu Kyi
faces the same problem. The middle tier of
governmental talent is missing. There are no
experienced cohorts of potential leaders that
have grown up under even a weak democratic
regime.
Burma lacks the institutional capacity
to move faster toward full democracy. Absent
is the wisdom, experience, and courage that
come from getting a strong basic education,
attending excellent colleges and universities,
reading a free press,66 and living in a
democratic society.
There is nevertheless some good news
from Burma. The work to build stronger
political and civic institutions in Burma
continues in many ways.
Interested students and activists regularly
gather in the U.S.-funded Jefferson Center
7
in Mandalay and the American Center in
Yangon61 to hear speakers, read books, use
the internet and meet other reform-minded
people. Recently, a team of my former
students, under the supervision of Professor
Myint Zan, participated in an international
criminal law moot court competition in
Nuremberg, Germany, commendably placing
in the third quartile.
In the anti-corruption classes I taught
at the University of Mandalay, students
studied the importance of ethics in public
life and discussed threats to democracy
around the world. They also wrote papers
about the opportunities for building strong
democracies, and made class presentations
about how to use law to fight corruption
in government,69 education,70 and the
professions.7' In my international economic
law classes, students discussed the comparative
merits of free trade and protectionism.
Young Burmese faculty members
recently presented papers at a conference
celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
University of Mandalay's law school. There
they addressed important topics: human
rights, shareholder emedies, environmental
law, the status of women, legal research, and
the rights of children.
In Naypyidaw, Burma's capital, I
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conducted training sessions for roughly three
dozen progressive members of Parliament
about critical issues facing their country.
The topics included the rule of law,72 judicial
independence,7 3 and international trade law.
Rather than skip these evening programs
sponsored by the National Democracy
Institute, which is funded by the USAID,
the parliamentary members listened carefully
to my translated talks and attentively studied
my PowerPoint slides, which had been
converted into Burmese. They peppered me
with questions to make sure they understood
my arguments.
Building an effective democracy and
a vibrant economy takes time, especially
when anti-democratic forces are strong and
recent history has been brutal.7 1 The United
States and other developed countries need to
continue to engage with the people of Burma
and to support their best hopes for the future.
Building an effective
democracy and a vibrant
economy takes time,
especially when anti-
democratic forces are strong
and recent history has been
brutaL
Those hopes are real. One can see that
hope on the faces of the Burmese people
on the vibrant streets, on the university
campuses, and in the market. They know that
democracy is much better than dictatorship
and prefer global connections to isolation.
At least in the cities in Burma, nearly
everyone has a cellphone and a Facebook
account.76 While cars are too expensive for
most people, electric and gas scooters are
ubiquitous. Looking at the people using their
phones and riding often two, three, or four
to a scooter, it is clear that they are happy.
They know how far they have come in the
past few years, and they want the future,
not the past. However, there is no quick fix
for the harm that was done by fifty years of
oppressive military rule.
111. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ISSUES RELATING TO BuRMA
Burma was cut off from international
trade for a long period of time. The isolation
of the country from foreign influences that
was imposed by Burma's military dictators
was matched by the sanctions other countries
imposed on Burma to punish the military
regime.` The American sanctions had a
negative impact on Burmas economy,7" and
caused exports from Burma to the United
States to drop to zero.79
According to a recent article:
The twenty-year history of
previous American sanctions can
be summarized briefly. In 1997,
President Clinton issued Executive
Order 13,047, which ordered
the imposition of sanctions on
Burma partly in response to "large-
scale repression of the democratic
opposition in Burma." These
sanctions were further developed by
the George W. Bush administration
in 2003, 2007, and 2008. In July
2012, the Obama administration
eased, but did not remove, sanctions
on Burma in recognition of the fact
that the Burmese government had
made "progress towards reform in a
number of areas." Then on October
7, 2016, Obama signed Executive
Order 13,742, which ordered the
termination of sanctions....
On June 16, 2017, the Department
of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control issued a final rule
terminating sanctions."
In the past eight years, international
treatment of Burma has begun to normalize
and Burma has begun to create a modern legal
framework for international trade. According
to William J. Schulte and Matthew H. Baird:
In January 2012, the United
States formally restored diplomatic
relations with Myanmar and
officially lifted the majority
of economic sanctions against
Myanmar. Many other Western
nations lifted sanctions as well.
In turn, in 2012 the Hluttaw,
Myanmar Parliament, enacted
the Foreign Investment Law as
an attempt to attract foreign
investment and help the country
develop. . . . and for the most
part, the strategy seems to be
paying off. Myanmar has since
grown its economy steadily at over
6 percent per year, and the Asian
Development Bank projects that to
rise above 8 percent in 2018. . . ."
A quartet of new intellectual property
laws will soon enter into force, enabling
Burma to protect the rights of its citizens in
copyrights, industrial designs, patents, and
trademarks" -as well as to comply with its
GATT obligations related to such interests.
"The long-awaited Myanmar Investment Law
was passed on 18 October 2016 . . . [as]
part of the government's efforts to continue
to attract foreign investment."" Of course,
more legal reforms are needed to deal with a
I
myriad of issues, such as foreign investment
in Burmese agriculture."
IV. ISSUES OF SPECIAL CONCERN
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
During the next twenty-five years,
scholars of international economic law
should, of course, study the full range of
legal issues that are important to developing
countries. Among many others, these issues
include: facilitation of electronic commerce,
5
the operation of the Generalized System
of Preferences," compliance with trade-
related intellectual property obligations,"
human rights-based trade sanctions,"
protectionist tariffs," the transparency and
predictability of WTO decisions," the
effectiveness of laws designed to protect
domestic industries, the limitations that
international trade agreements impose on
domestic legislative options," bilateral
and regional alternatives to the WTO's
multilateral trading regime,2 and how to
offer foreign investors "one-stop shopping"
by setting up simplified, convenient, and
consistent regulatory processes related to the
approval and operation of joint ventures and
wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
Government decision
makers must possess a
great array of knowledge.





In addition, there are two other issues
that, while perhaps less obvious, are equally
important to developing countries. Those
issues relate to education and corruption.
A. EDUCATION
In order for a developing country to
prosper in a world of globalized trade, its
politicians and businesses must be able to
make sound decisions. Sound decisions
must rest on a strong educational foundation
that makes it possible for decision makers
to ask good questions, gather information,
understand and evaluate alternatives, chart an
intelligent course, and implement decisions
in a way that prepares for foreseeable
obstacles and effectively deals with problems
that cannot be anticipated.
Government decision makers must
possess a great array of knowledge. They
must understand the international economic
law framework within which international
business transactions take place. They must
appreciate complex interaction between
international agreements and domestic
legislation. They must also comprehend the
operation of markets, the role of international
supply chains, and the way in which
international trade affects not only persons
who engage in international trade, but also
persons who do not, who must nevertheless
compete against products imported from
other countries in a world that is "flat."
These intellectual challenges are
formidable. They require decision makers
to understand how tariffs distort both the
production and consumption of products,
protecting inefficient producers and
penalizing the efficient. Decision makers
must also appreciate how nontariff barriers,
such as those relating to product standards or
content, can be as pernicious as tariffs charged
I3
on imports at the border; how domestic
regulations related to public morals, health,
safety, and the environment can impinge
upon the efficiencies of trade;94 and how
there must be a venue, such as the WTO,
for reconciling competing state interests in
a manner that is principled, consistent, and
capable avoiding economic chaos in times of
global crisis. The champions of developing
countries must also understand that the
interests of such states can sometimes be
more effectively advanced through collective
action and coalition building within a WTO-
like entity,'5 rather than by individually
bargaining with developed countries for tariff
reductions or preferential trade agreements.
Developing countries have often
prepared for modernizing their economies
and doing international business by sending
scholars abroad to study in developed
countries. When those scholars return
home, they sometimes play a leading role
in reforming legal institutions and business
operations. For example, the young scholars
who were sent by China to the United States
in late 1800s eventually led the efforts to
modernize the industrial operations of the
late Qing dynasty.'6 Similar stories have
played out many times all over the globe.
The knowledge gap that places developing
countries at a disadvantage in competing in
international trade can also be addressed if
developed countries send scholars abroad to
teach at foreign universities. For example,
over the past seventy years, the Fulbright
Scholar Program has facilitated the exchange
of 370,000 scholars.'7 In hundreds, if not
thousands, of cases, American professors have
been posted to developing countries, often
to teach in fields related to law, business,
and international trade." Those efforts
I
have helped to minimize the educational
deficiencies that often handicap developing
countries.
With the current rise of nationalism
and protectionism in countries around the
world, these types of educational exchange
programs are at risk. For example, students
from developing countries find it more
difficult today to obtain educational visas
to study in the United States than was true
just a few years ago.9' Early in his presidency,
Donald Trump proposed drastically reducing
the budget for the Fulbright Scholar Program
by 47%, which would have eliminated
numerous grants and crippled working
relationships with educational partners in
other countries.0 0 Fortunately, the allies of
the Fulbright program in Congress did not
allow that to happen. 101
Scholars of international economic law
must be attentive to efforts that threaten
to undermine the important role that
international educational exchange plays
in supporting developing countries that are
seeking to compete in a world of globalized
trade. Without such educational support, it
is unlikely that developing countries such
as Burma will have a fair chance to prosper.
B. CORRUPTION
Corruption undercuts a developing
country's participation in international
trade in at least two ways. First, corruption
in the production and marketing of goods
distorts the pricing of those goods, making
them more expensive than they should
be, and therefore less able to compete
successfully in international markets. This
type of corruption threatens to waste the
"comparative advantage"0 2 that a country
may have in producing certain types of
goods, and makes such goods less attractive
to foreign buyers.'
Second, corrupt practices which
distort the distribution of profits from
international trade undermine public
confidence in the legitimacy of liberal
trade practices. This is a serious problem
because if the international trading system
is perceived to be rigged, businesses and
even ordinary citizens are likely to demand
protection from foreign competition.'
They will argue that "mercantilism"-the
promotion of domestic manufacturing and
restrictive import policies'0 -is a more
sensible government position than "trade
liberalism"'0 6 or its more extreme variation
"neo-liberal trade,""1 07 the latter of which
links efforts to promote international
trade with aggressive deregulation and
protection of intellectual property, as well
as free movement of capital and rejection of




international trade in at
least two ways.
Burma has a long history of corrupt
business practices." Similar challenges exist
in all countries."o If in Burma, ordinary
citizens were deprived of their fair share of
the profits that follow from international
trade,I" it would be perfectly understandable
for them to oppose the types of foreign
competition and investment that are likely
to cause the loss of Burmese jobs.
Corruption can be fought in many ways.
Malefactors can be vigorously prosecuted
under criminal laws. Adequate compensation
and benefits can be paid to public employees
to reduce the likelihood of bribery. Laws can
penalize foreign corrupt practices, forbid
the awarding of government contracts
to entities in which public officials hold
interests, or prohibit gifts to public servants
or closely related persons. Open-meetings
and open-records laws can fight corruption
by increasing government transparency.
Defamation laws can protect critics from libel
and slander actions when they expose and
discuss issues related to the performance of
public duties."2 Ethics codes can be adopted
and enforced to set standards of conduct for
key public actors, such as lawyers, judges,
public officials, state employees, lobbyists,
government contractors, and educational
personnel.
'The problem is not that there are too few
tools for fighting corruption in public life,
nor even that there are too many. Rather, the
problem is that such tools are often poorly
articulated and haphazardly employed.
International law has begun to play an
important role in fighting corruption within
states that are parties to international trade
agreements. Numerous anti-corruption
conventions have been enacted, including:
the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption; 113 the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption of the
Organization of American States;" the
Civil Law Convention on Corruption of
the Council of Europe;"- the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption of the Council of
Europe;"' the African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combatting Corruption;."
and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)
Convention on Combatting Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions.""
These anti-corruption instruments
are creating a widening web of legal tools
that can be used to fight corruption
related to international trade. 'They must
increasingly be seen as a crucial element
of international economic law. These
agreements must be studied by scholars and
implemented at the state level, particularly
by developing countries, in order to ensure
that corrupt practices do not undermine
public confidence in international trade or
otherwise handicap the ability of developing
countries to compete in world markets.
V. CONCLUSION
In the field of international economic
law, the stakes for developing countries are
great. At issue is not merely the question
of whether such countries will prosper, but
what type of world they will live in. Former
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull' 19
believed that "unhampered trade dovetailed
with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and
unfair economic competition with war."
21
1
That was not an uncommon view. Many
believed that the protectionist trade policies
that preceded the Second World War set the
stage for that conflict."' The reformers who
were determined after the War to build a
better, more peaceful world-through the
establishment of the United Nations,12 2 the
World Bank,2 1 the International Monetary
Fund,"4 the Marshall Plan, "I and the
Fulbright Scholar Program "'-believed
that the free trade principles reflected in the
1947 GATT had an important role to play
in minimizing international conflicts. 2 7 This
idea may be as valid today as it was three-
quarters of a century ago.
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Who are the developing countries in
the WTO?, WTO, https://swww.
wro.org/english/tratop-e/dev el-e/
dlwho-e.htn [http://perma.cc/
LH2Z-K6BK] (last visited Oct.
27, 2018) [hereinaf/er Who are
the developing countries in the
WTO] ("Developing countries
comprise a majority of the WTO
membership. They are grouped
as 'developing countries' and
'least developed countries'. . . ,
[However, there] are no WTO
definitions of 'developed' and
'developing' countries. Members
announce for themselves
whether they are 'developed' or
'developing' countries. However,
other members can challenge
the decision of a member to
make use of provisions available
to developing countries."); see
also Chiedu Osakwe, Developing
Countries and GATTywTO Rules:
Dynamic Transformssaions in Trade
Policy Behavior and Performance,
20 MINN. J. INTL. L. 365, 376
(2011) ("The composition and
role of developing countries in
the Multilateral Trading System is
complex and evolving. The group
is heterogeneous. It is neither
a monolith nor is it unitary. Its
interests are mixed, uncertain, and
in some cases, divergent,").




87AF] (last visited Nov. 3, 2018)
(explaining since July 29, 2016,
there have been 164 members of
the WTO).
3. John M. Vernon. Mexico Accession
to the GATT A Catalyst at Gads
with the Outcome?, 24 S'r. MARY'S
L.J. 717, 720 (1993) ("The GAT
is the framework that establishes
the parameters for the trading
policies and trading activities of
its contracting parties. 'The GAT
freezes tariffs at agreed levels and
sets forth certain international
trading rules including the 'most-
favored-nation principle,' which
requires each contracting parry
to afford every other country
the lowest rates available to the
products of any country,").
4. MxrrnuAs HERDEGEN, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNomic
LAW 102-06 (2d ed. 2016)
(discussing the World Trade
Organization); see also Robert P
Deyling, Free Trade Agreements
and the Federal Courts: Fmerging
Issues, 27 ST. MARY S L.J. 353, 381
(1996) ("Under the l`TO regime,
the trade dispute resolution system
created by the General Agreeient
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . .
. [was] strengthened to provide
for binding decisions by WTO
dispute settlement panels,"); see
generally Who We Are, WTO,
https://www.wto.orglenglish/
thewto e/wharis e/who we._
aree.htm )http://perma.cc/
LH2Z-K6BK] (last visited Nov.
4, 2018).
5. See Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden
Costs of International Dispute
Settlement: WTO Review of
DomesticAnti-Dumping Decisions,
34 L. & POLICY INTL. Bus. 109,
176-77 (2002) ("Practically
speaking, a smaller state . . . faced
. . . the choice of either signing
on to the new agreements . . .
or risk being left behind by the
world trading system. This was
quite literally true in the Uruguay
Round, which substituted the
'GATT 1994' for the original
GATT and thus ended the
obligations of GATT members
utnder the original agreement.");
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK ET AL., IHE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 655 (4th ed. 2013) ("It
is no longer contentious that
active participation in the global
economy is essential to economic
development."); see also Robert E.
Hudec, GA TTand the Developing
Countries, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 67, 74 (1992) (indicating
that between 1980 and the early
1990s, there was "a radical change
in the internal policies of many'
developing countries. Confronted
with debt crises, pressure from
international lending agencies,
and economic stagnation inder
the old system, many developing
countries . . . slashed trade
barriers and moved towards a
more modern market-oriented
economic policy.').
6. See TREBILCOCK et al., supro note
5. at 607-15 (discussing the history
of developing countries in the
multilateral trading system);
HERDEGEN, supra note 4, at 216
(discussing provisions on trade
and development that were added
to the GATT in 1965 which
created preferences for developing
countries).
7. See TREBILCOCK et al., supra note
5, at 634; see also HERDECEN, supra
note 4, at 213 ("Most-favoured-
nation treatment essentially means
that trade advantages granted to
one contracting party must be
granted to all other parties.").
8. See Who are the developing
countries in the WTO?, supra
note I ("There are ... provisions
in some WTO Agreements which
provide developing countries
with longer transition periods
before they are required to fully
implement the agreement and
developing countries can receive
technical assistance."); Vernon,
supra note 3, at 723 ("Because
Mexico acceded to the GATT as a
developing country, it was eligible
for special treatment accorded such
countries in terms of compliance
with GATT rules. By acceding to
the GATT Mexico became eligible
for all benefits resulting from the
application of the GATT's basic
principles, such as the most-
favored-nation principle which
contracting parties are bound to
respect. However, the contracting
parties did not compel Mexico in
certain circumstances to comply
strictly with its obligations under
the basic GATT principles.").
9. See TREBILCOCK et al., supra note
5, at 613-14 ("Paragraph 57 of
the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration stated: Aid for
Trade should aim to provide help
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